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Intelligent tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game
Seung Ki Baek and Beom Jun Kim∗
Department of Physics, BK21 Physics Research Division,
and Institute of Basic Science, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon 440-746, Korea
We seek a route to the equilibrium where all the agents cooperate in the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma game on a two-dimensional plane, focusing on the role of tit-for-tat strategy. When a time
horizon, within which a strategy can recall the past, is one time step, an equilibrium can be achieved
as cooperating strategies dominate the whole population via proliferation of tit-for-tat. Extending
the time horizon, we filter out poor strategies by simplified replicator dynamics and observe a similar
evolutionary pattern to reach the cooperating equilibrium. In particular, the rise of a modified tit-
for-tat strategy plays a central role, which implies how a robust strategy is adopted when provided
with an enhanced memory capacity.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg, 89.75.-k, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main interests in statistical physics is re-
lated with the equilibration process of a given system
composed of many interacting elements. For instance,
the classical Ising system made up of locally interact-
ing spins approaches an equilibrium, characterized by the
minimum of the Helmholtz free energy. Such a model sys-
tem in statistical physics is defined by the Hamiltonian
and can be readily studied by updating spins with local
Monte Carlo rules in numerical simulations [1]. A lot
of interactions including ecological, social, and economi-
cal ones are more complicated than that of spins as they
are usually asymmetric and history dependent. Further-
more, most of these systems beyond the simple physics
model cannot be described by the simple Hamiltonian
approach. Even if no analytical solution is available, we
may expect the system to evolve by successive local adap-
tations, with searching for an optimal point on the fitness
landscape. However, when the interaction is asymmet-
ric, it is possible that the equilibrium reached by local
dynamics may not be optimal in a global sense.
The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game is a famous model
of such disparity. The typical story begins as follows.
Two suspected accomplices are caught by the police for
a crime deserving of 4 years’ imprisonment each. After
separating two suspects from each other, the police of-
fers a deal to each of them: If only one confesses the
crime and the other remains silent, the informer will be
rewarded and set free, while the other one will receive
an aggravated punishment (say 5 years in prison). On
the other hand, if both keep silent, they will get some
punishment which is supposed to be not so heavy (e.g.,
2 years in prison). It is still true that they can get light
punishments by cooperating to each other. From an in-
dividual viewpoint, however, it is always better to defect
the other, so they will be eventually sentenced 8 years in
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total as the police wanted. Throughout the present pa-
per, the game results are quantified by four elementary
payoffs: The temptation to defect as T = 5, the reward
of cooperation as R = 3, the punishment from mutual
defection as P = 1, and the damage from being sucked
as S = 0. Note that the payoffs satisfy two inequalities.
The first one T > R > P > S locates the Nash equilib-
rium [2] at mutual defection, and the second 2R > T +S
sets the mutual cooperation as optimal in total.
The conclusion of the PD game is highly nontrivial
in that local optimization will end up with the poorest
result in a global sense. The first breakthrough in this
dilemma was made by performing the game iteratively,
where the system could achieve the optimal point of mu-
tual cooperation [3]. Iteration affects the system’s tra-
jectory in two ways: Since the strategy space comes to
have a much larger dimensionality than choosing between
cooperation and defection, there enters a possible route
to mutual cooperation. In addition, as the time scale of
interaction is separated from that of selection, the sta-
bility of equilibria and their basins of attraction may be
changed: As to the PD game, for example, slow selec-
tion favors the weaker strategy (i.e., cooperation) from a
population genetics point of view [4]. Nevertheless, the
equilibrium in which all agents cooperate is usually ac-
cessed by a detour consisting of intermediate stages.
In the iterated PD game, there are successfully coop-
erating strategies some of which are as follows: (i) Grim
trigger (GT) initially cooperates, but any single defection
by its opponent makes GT defect forever [5]. (ii) tit-for-
tat (TFT) also starts with cooperation, and then does
what the opponent did. This simple strategy is famous
for its own virtues, i.e., being nice, retaliating, forgiving,
and nonenvious [3]. By nice, we mean that a strategy
never provokes the opponent first by defection. Likewise,
retaliating and forgiving mean that it defects after de-
fected, and cooperates when the opponent changes back
to cooperation. Finally, by being nonenvious, TFT al-
lows coexistence of other strategies. However, one should
note that an erroneous defection between TFT’s leads to
a chain retribution until a new error makes them cooper-
ate again. (iii) Pavlov keeps its last move if paid highly
2and switches to a different move otherwise, as it is of-
ten called win-stay lose-shift [6]. Unlike the other two, it
forgives a mistake between themselves.
Since the above-mentioned three strategies remember
only the moves in the last time step, they all belong to
a set of strategies which are confined in the time hori-
zon of one time step, which we will call M1. Note that
the actual amount of information in use is different: GT
and TFT require only the opponent’s last move, while
Pavlov recalls both of its opponent’s and its own. Like-
wise, Mn means the set of strategies which uses the last
k(≤ n) time steps in making a decision. By giving an ex-
plicit restriction to the time horizon, our strategy space
is different from that in the state space approach [7].
In order to investigate how the system is evolved by
selection and adaptation, we start with every possible
strategy in M1 and M2, respectively, and examine sur-
viving strategies to understand the route to the equilib-
rium. While the genetic algorithm has been often used
in exploring a large strategy space [8, 9], we aim at an
almost exhaustive search in that all the strategies are
explicitly considered at least once. In particular, we do
not include any mutation processes as in Ref. [10] for fix-
ing the strategy space we must scan. Nor do we treat
stochastic strategies [11, 12, 13, 14], as the deterministic
representation shows the pure decision characteristics of
a strategy more clearly. Note that we mostly employ typ-
ical setups except for the time horizon in order to keep
the situation as simple as possible. We therefore pass
over many interesting variations of the PD game, such
as the idea of payoff-based strategies [15]. The spatial
structure we study here is a two-dimensional plane which
provides spatial reciprocity for cooperators [16] (see, e.g.,
Refs. [17, 18] for other topological structures), but we do
not employ the dynamic preferential selection [19] and
let each agent play with its every neighbor equally. Un-
der such conditions, we find that M2 has its own TFT
modified from the original one in M1, which seemingly
indicates a generic pattern in the evolution of coopera-
tion. Even though the reciprocity has been thought of as
relevant to the emergence of cooperation even in longer
time horizons [8], such concrete strategic forms, which
are directly related to the original TFT, have not been
reported yet.
The present paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II,
we check the case of M1 to introduce our basic scheme.
In Sec. III, we apply it to M2 and present the surviving
strategies, including the modified type of TFT. Finally,
we discuss and conclude this work in Sec. IV.
II. METHODS
A. Bitwise representation of strategies in M1
A strategy in M1 can be conveniently denoted by five
bits, each of which can take either cooperation (C) or de-
fection (D): The first bit, α, is the move when a player
TABLE I: Bitwise representation of a strategy in M1 as
α|a1a2a3a4.
State Empty (C,C) (C,D) (D,C) (D,D)
Player’s move α a1 a2 a3 a4
first encounters an opponent and thus has empty mem-
ory. The bit a1 is the move at time t when the player’s
and opponent’s previous moves at t − 1 were C and C
[henceforth we denote this situation as (player’s move at
t− 1, opponent’s move at t− 1) = (C,C)] , respectively
(Table I). Likewise, a2 is for (C,D), a3 for (D,C), and
a4 for (D,D).
Consequently, a strategy inM1 is coded by α|a1a2a3a4
and the total number of strategies is |M1| = 2
5 = 32, for
each of five bits can have either C or D. For exam-
ple, C|CDDD, C|CDCD, and C|CDDC encode GT,
TFT and Pavlov, respectively. Further examples include
the unconditional cooperator (ALLC or AC) coded by
C|CCCC and the unconditional defector (ALLD or AD)
by D|DDDD. A nice strategy (see above) in M1 is rep-
resented as α = C, implying that it starts with C at
the first encounter, and a1 = C, meaning that it never
provokes the defection first [28].
B. Transition graphs and tournament for M1
Another way of representing a strategy is to mention
all of the possible states it may meet and all of the possi-
ble transitions between them [9, 20, 21]. Identifying each
state with a vertex and each transition with an arc (a
directed edge), with self-connecting included, this pro-
cedure yields a transition graph for each strategy. Sup-
pose, for example, that Alice employs TFT and Bob does
another arbitrary strategy in M1. From Alice’s view-
point, the four possible states are represented by four
pairs; (C,C), (C,D), (D,C), and (D,D) where the for-
mer character indicates her last move and the latter does
Bob’s. If starting with (C,C), the next state must be
(C,X) with X = C or D depending on Bob’s strategy,
because Alice remembers what Bob did at the last en-
counter. Repeating this for all the states gives Fig. 1.
One can easily get the graphical representations for any
other strategies by the same procedure, noting that the
initial bit α does not change the transition graph but
only makes the starting vertex in the graph different.
From all the 16 transition graphs in M1, TFT is found
to be unique in that it does not permit returning to
(C,D) without visiting (D,C), which implies that any
strategy cannot repeatedly suck TFT avoiding retalia-
tion. In order to describe the time course of the PD
game between two agents, the distinction between tran-
sient and recurrent states needs to be made: Transient
states have only outward arcs and thus cannot be vis-
ited repeatedly, while the recurrent states are visited over
and over again. For example, TFT does not have tran-
3C,C D,C
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FIG. 1: Transition graph for TFT. Each vertex represents a
state in Table I, and the directed edges are the possible next
states allowed by this strategy. Each vertex has two outgoing
arcs, considering the move taken by the opponent.
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FIG. 2: Transition graphs from combining two strategies in
M1. (a) GT vs GT. If deviated from (C,C), the only attractor
is mutual defection. (b) TFT vs TFT. If mistaken, they do not
recover mutual cooperation on their own, unless another error
brings them back. (c) Pavlov vs Pavlov, forgiving an error
between themselves. (d) Pavlov vs GT. Pavlov is defeated by
GT if any error occurs.
sient states, while AD has two transient states (C,C) and
(C,D) with two recurrent states (D,C) and (D,D).
If two strategies i and j in M1 play the PD game to-
gether, two corresponding graphs are combined to make
one deterministic transition graph (Fig. 2). The move
sequence is periodic and the long-time limit of the aver-
age payoff per time step is determined only by recurrent
states of the two, from which one can calculate easily Uij ,
the average payoff per step that the strategy i gains from
j. In the same spirit as the original tournament held by
Axelrod, we compute the average points the strategy i
gets from all strategies (including i) to obtain Table II.
So far as each pair of strategies has an equal acquain-
tance probability, the tournament results will converge
to these values in the long-time limit. Moreover, since
each value in this table is analytically calculated from pe-
riodic moves in pairs of deterministic strategies, one can
decompose it into the elementary payoffs, T , R, P , and
S. For example, AD, AC, and GT earn (T + P )/2 = 3,
(R + S)/2 = 1.5, and R/2 + (T + P )/4 = 3, respec-
tively. One can see that TFT is not the best within M1
and that strategies with more D bits often outperform
cooperators. We emphasize that the above results in a
round-robin tournament are not related to an evolution-
ary process yet and need to be checked from evolutionary
perspectives.
C. Spatial prisoner’s dilemma game for M1
The spatial PD game (SPDG) provides a good frame-
work for observing the emergent cooperation as it allows
the cooperating strategies to make clusters against de-
fectors [16]. There is no unique standard in constructing
SPDG, and a different rule may yield a different output,
in general. Here we present our SPDG rules, which have
been extensively used in literature [18].
We perform SPDG on a two-dimensional 128 × 128
square lattice with the periodic boundary condition. In
the initial stage of the SPDG, one among all 32 strategies
in M1 is randomly assigned to each node of the lattice,
and every agent plays the PD game with her four nearest
neighbors. After all agents play the game, often called
one Monte Carlo (MC) step, this procedure is stopped
with a preassigned probability p or repeats itself with
1 − p. When stopped, the sequence of games so far is
termed as one generation whose average time duration
is 1/p MC steps. In order to make the effects of tran-
sient states (see above) as weak as possible, p should be
sufficiently small to ensure that one generation is long
enough (we observe that p = 0.05, corresponding to one
generation as 20 MC steps on average, fulfills this require-
ment). Whenever a generation is closed, the selection
mechanism is activated as follows: Every node, one by
one, randomly chooses one of its nearest neighbors and
adopts the neighbor’s strategy if the neighbor has gained
more during that generation. Memory tables for all pairs
of agents are recalculated and payoffs are initialized back
to zero, and then the next generation begins.
Our SPDG simulation readily shows that a cooperating
equilibrium, in which all of the agents are playing C,
is achieved mostly by GT, TFT, and Pavlov, together
with a minor strategy C|CDCC [Fig. 3(a)]. It is notable
that these surviving four strategies are, in fact, the four
4TABLE II: Average points 1
|M1|
P
j
Uij for each strategy in M1.
Strategy Points Strategy Points Strategy Points Strategy Points
AD 3.00 C|DDDC 2.73 C|DDCC 2.25 C|DCCD 1.69
D|CCDD 3.00 D|DCDC 2.73 D|DDCD 2.22 C|DCCC 1.63
C|DDDD 3.00 Pavlov 2.56 C|CDCC 2.19 AC 1.50
GT 3.00 D|CCDC 2.38 D|CDCC 2.09 C|CCDC 1.50
D|CDDD 3.00 C|DDCD 2.36 D|CDCD 2.02 C|CCCD 1.50
D|DCDD 3.00 TFT 2.35 C|DCDC 1.90 C|CCDD 1.50
D|DDDC 2.97 D|DDCC 2.25 D|DCCD 1.86 D|CCCC 1.50
D|CDDC 2.89 C|DCDD 2.25 D|DCCC 1.81 D|CCCD 1.38
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Comparison between SPDG and RD.
(a) A simulation result on a 128 × 128 lattice with p = 0.05.
(b) Numerical integration of Eq. (2).
possibilities when we fix the nice bits (α = C, a1 = C)
and the retaliating bit (a2 = D). This implies that the
virtues of TFT (see above) are indeed very important
conditions for a strategy to be evolutionarily successful.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) A pattern in SPDG on the 128 × 128
lattice with e = 0.01 and p = 0.05. Even with the presence of
error, almost all the dynamical patterns at large time scales
occur within the strategies found in the error-free RD, if the
error probability is sufficiently low.
D. Replicator dynamics and filtering
As the direct SPDG often requires an amount of com-
putation, we bypass the problem using the replicator
dynamics (RD) [22] with average payoffs [23, 24, 25]:
Once the average payoffs are obtained from the transition
graphs, the time evolution of the fraction of each strategy
can, phenomenologically but conveniently, be described
by RD within the assumption of the full mixing, corre-
sponding to the mean-field approximation.
Suppose that we perform SPDG with randomly dis-
tributed strategies in a two-dimensional L × L square
lattice with the total number of agents Na ≡ L
2. Since
each agent plays the game with z = 4 nearest neighbors,
the expected gain that an agent with the strategy i col-
lects, within the assumption of a full mixing, is written
as
Ui =
∑
j
zUijφj , (1)
where φj is the fraction defined as the number of agents
5of the strategy j divided by Na with
∑
i φi = 1, and
Uij is the above-mentioned average gain i gets from j.
If the relative growth rate of a strategy is proportional
to its relative payoff deviated from the average over the
whole population, we may write an ordinary differential
equation
dφi
dt
=

Ui −
∑
j
Ujφj

φi, (2)
which is called the replicator dynamics. Note that if each
strategy forms a cluster, the summation over the nearest
neighbors of i cannot cover the whole space, and we must
examine what happens near the interfaces.
Although the RD description is more crude than the
actual SPDG with local interactions, we find that the
numerical integration of RD is surprisingly similar to
what SPDG yields with the random initial distribution
of strategies. In Fig. 3(b), it is displayed that the four
nice strategies of GT, TFT, Pavlov, and C|CDCC sur-
vive just like the previous observation made for SPDG.
Furthermore, the order of relative fractions of the four
is identical in both results. Note that these four strate-
gies are indistinguishable at this stage, because the bits
other than a1 are not actually used any more. In order to
slightly activate those bits and check how the surviving
strategies behave in the presence of erroneous decisions,
we allow each player in SPDG to make mistakes at a
given probability e. For example, e = 0.01 means that an
agent’s memory on a neighbor’s last move may be flipped
from C to D or D to C, once in 100 moves on average.
Depending on the initial condition, various steady-state
configurations are obtained. In many cases, however, we
find that Pavlov eventually conquers the whole territory,
defeating TFT [13], under such a low error rate (Fig. 4).
It is important that the error-free RD equilibrium
selects out the long run strategies which appear in
SPDG [25]. The dynamics among these strategies are
driven by errors in much larger time scales than the fast
extinctions. When e ≪ 1, the difference in these two
time scales makes it possible to separate the fast extinc-
tions from the long run behaviors. We point out that this
selection can be further simplified, considering that each
strategy occupies only a small fraction at the early stages
and that the strategy with the least payoff decreases most
rapidly. That is, the least fit strategy will be shortly re-
moved from the population in effect, and the remainder’s
payoffs are rectified accordingly. Eliminating the least fit
actually reaches the same cooperating equilibrium with
the minimal number of computations, and it works sim-
ilarly to the technique called the iterated elimination of
dominated strategies [26]. This procedure will be de-
noted as RD filtering since it is based on a fundamental
assumption of RD that the growth rate of a species is
proportional to its payoff. After it simulates the initial
short times until reaching an equilibrium, we come back
to SPDG and consider the slow dynamics due to errors
among survivors. Nevertheless, we stress that this pro-
cedure is only a rough approximation and one should be
careful not to expect general coincidence between them.
Based on the numerical support inM1, we are suggesting
that this procedure can be regarded as a criterion that
a feasible strategy is supposed to pass, rather than as
a precise equivalent of SPDG. One obvious drawback is
that it precludes much of the possibility of cyclic behav-
iors allowed by the continuous RD [27], as we give the
least fit no chance to return back (via, e.g, mutations)
once removed.
III. APPLICATION TO M2
A. Approach to memory effects
Let us proceed to the study of the strategies in M2 to
examine the effects of memory capacity in evolution. In
order to decide the move at time t, an agent needs to
remember her own moves and the opponent’s moves at
t−1 and t−2, respectively, corresponding to 24 = 16 bits.
Until the agent meets the opponent more than once, the
past information is not yet available and thus the strategy
should specify the moves for this case with two more bits
for the initial two encounters. Accordingly, the number
of strategies inM2 is counted as |M2| = 2
16+2 = 262 144.
Based on the previous results for M1, we use the same
method to filter out unsuccessful strategies in an early
stage, and then play SPDG only for surviving strategies.
B. RD filtering
In the filtering procedure for M2, we again calculate
Uij in the same way as before and use the mean-field
payoff function in Eq. (1), assuming the full mixing. This
reflects the fact that the initial strategies are randomly
distributed and the number of remaining strategies turns
out to be large enough to neglect clustering effects even
at the equilibrium. The iterated elimination stops when
no more strategies can be removed.
During 1.4 × 105 steps to reach the goal, we record
the number of remaining strategies N and their expected
payoffs U ranged over [Umin, Umax]. For comprehension,
this range is divided by N at each step in Fig. 5. Both of
Umin/N and Umax/N eventually shrinks to a single point
at 3.0, indicating that all of the strategies obtain R = 3
from mutual cooperation. From the concave shape of
Umax/N , we see two eras: Roughly before three-quarters
of the whole period, Umax/N decreases by removing the
least fit, as the top-ranked strategies exploit naive coop-
erators. After the prey is consumed out, however, they
become the next victims. Removing defectors now en-
hances the degree of cooperation and Umax/N rises up
as well. There are observed two great extinctions in
that 212 = 4096 strategies disappear simultaneously at
the 1424th and 124 910th steps, respectively. These are
6TABLE III: Strategy table for M2.
Statea Ω (C/D)b ECc ETd I-TFTe State Ω (C/D) EC ET I-TFT
(CC,CC) 100/0 C C C (DC,CC) 50/50 D D C
(CC,CD) 42/58 C C D (DC,CD) 45/55 - - D
(CC,DC) 52/48 D D C (DC,DC) 50/50 C D C
(CC,DD) 6/94 - - D (DC,DD) 47/53 - - C
(CD,CC) 54/46 C C D (DD,CC) 52/48 - - C
(CD,CD) 48/52 C C - f (DD,CD) 47/53 - - C
(CD,DC) 56/44 - - C (DD,DC) 50/50 - - C
(CD,DD) 31/69 - - D (DD,DD) 53/47 - - D
a A state (X1X2, Y1Y2) means that X1 and X2 (Y1 and Y2) are player’s (the opponent’s) moves at two subsequent times,
respectively.
b Percentages of C and D in Ω, the set of the remaining strategies after RD filtering.
c Efficient cooperator’s moves at each given state.
d Efficient trigger’s moves. Although similar to EC’s, this does not follow EC at (DC,DC) but defects it.
e I-TFT’s moves. The moves at the recurrent states are underlined.
f If both of C and D are observed, the move is written as blank.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Filtering procedure on M2. It takes
about 1.4× 105 steps to reach a cooperating equilibrium. (a)
The remaining fraction N/Nt, where N is the number of sur-
vivors and Nt = 2
18 = 262 144. Insets show the two great
extinction events at the 1424th and 124 910th steps, respec-
tively. (b) The maximum and minimum values of the payoffs,
divided by N . The straight line represents R = 3, the reward
for mutual cooperation. Insets and arrows are for the great
extinction events again.
symbolic of two eras, because AC is taken off at the first
extinction and AD is at the second.
After completing the filtering procedure, we find an
equilibrium, where 12 944 surviving strategies constitute
a set Ω. The number is still large but only about 5% of
|M2|. There are two properties in this set: (i) All strate-
gies in Ω are nice in the sense that they never defect first.
(ii) After defected at the last two steps, about 94% of the
surviving strategies choose to retaliate. It is also remark-
able that GT and TFT are included in Ω but Pavlov is
dropped out.
C. Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game for M2
We next perform SPDG with e > 0 for Ω on a two-
dimensional 500× 500 lattice in the same manner as we
did for M1. Note that the lattice size is almost 20 times
greater than the number of strategies, which turns out to
be enough to find recognizably common patterns. After
2.4×104 generations, most strategies in Ω also disappear
and the number of survivors is usually less than 10 in
each realization (Table III).
First, we observe two strategies with only eight re-
current states per each. They are named as intelligent-
TFT (I-TFT) in common, because TFT is embedded as
an attractor in their recurrent states and the transient
states are activated only when an error occurs [Fig. 6(a)].
Again, the state (XtXt+1, YtYt+1) represents that Xt and
Xt+1 (Yt and Yt+1) are the player’s (the opponent’s)
moves at two subsequent times (X,Y = C or D), which
is connected to (Xt+1Xt+2, Yt+1Yt+2) by a directed arc.
Without errors, they are ordinary TFT and never sucked
repeatedly by any other strategies. With errors, on the
other hand, they return back to mutual cooperation with-
out the chain retribution between themselves, overcom-
ing the weakness of the classical TFT. Furthermore, this
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Graphical representations of surviving strategies in M2. (a) The full transition graph for I-TFT. Only
the black vertices are recurrent states, while others are transient (see also Fig. 1). The dashed arcs indicate the paths activated
when an error occurs between I-TFT’s. Since two strategies acting as I-TFT are found, we describe the duality in the graphs
by the dotted arcs connected to two (CD,CD) (at the top-left and the bottom). (b) Parts of transition graphs characterizing
EC and ET. While an EC-typed strategy tries to recover mutual cooperation (CC,CC) from an erroneous state (CC,CD) by
the dashed lines, an ET-typed strategy repeatedly defects it by the dotted line.
error tolerance is secured from repeated abuse by being
transient. We therefore conclude that the only way to
defeat I-TFT is more efficient cooperation than I-TFT’s.
As long as the error occurs rarely enough not to disturb
its recovery path, I-TFT will clear the defecting strate-
gies out and eventually make way for better cooperators.
Such efficient cooperators are characterized by the way
of dealing with an error between themselves, depicted in
Fig. 6(b) with the dashed lines. We denote those strate-
gies with such an error recovery path as efficient coop-
erator (EC). An EC-typed strategy outperforms I-TFT
because it costs less by one point in recovering an er-
ror. This one point may look small but has a signifi-
cant meaning after thousands of generations. Yet an EC
strategy can be invaded by even such a trivial strategy in
M1 as α|DDCC which simply alternate between C and
D, regardless of α. That is, inserted among the strate-
gies of M1, an EC-typed strategy does not overwhelm
M1 and sometimes becomes exterminated. Meanwhile,
I-TFT under the same condition works so successfully
that it wins the whole area by defeating all of the M1
strategies, including Pavlov, in every realization so long
as p is small enough.
Last, some cooperating strategies are triggered to de-
ceive EC by a single error: At the last step of EC’s error
recovery phase, they defect again, instead of getting back
to (CC,CC) as desired, and complete the exploiting loop
[see the dotted line in Fig. 6(b)]. Even if they are trigger
strategies specialized to defeat EC, from which we simply
call them efficient trigger (ET), I-TFT suppresses them
and helps EC to rise [Figs. 7(a) and 7(b)].
Those two I-TFT strategies are distinguished by how
they respond to the state (CD,CD) (Table III). Let us
denote the I-TFT strategy responding with C as I-TFTC
and that with D as I-TFTD. Comparing a population
of I-TFTC with that of I-TFTD, the former is slightly
better off, as the latter has a probability of O(e2) that
both players make errors at the same time, leading to
(CD,CD)→ (DD,DD) [Fig. 6(a)].
If we repeat this SPDG procedure after removing I-
TFT from Ω, some variants of I-TFT play the role of
protecting EC. They have only one or two different bits
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FIG. 7: (Color online) SPDG for M2. (a) All of the 12 944
strategies in Ω are initially distributed on 500 × 500 lattices.
They are classified as EC, ET, I-TFT and other miscellaneous
ones, and the plotted values are averaged over 50 realizations.
(b) Three representative strategies belonging to EC, ET, and
I-TFT, respectively, are distributed on a 32 × 32 lattice. (c)
Averaged results over 10 realizations on 500×500 lattices, af-
ter removing two I-TFT strategies and their six similar vari-
ants (see text) from Ω. There are given p = 0.02 and e = 0.01
in common.
from either of I-TFT strategies, but their recurrent states
do not constitute TFT. Further removing such variants,
we see that EC strategies are helplessly threatened by
the parasitic ET [Fig. 7(c)]. Since ET strategies cannot
do well with errors, the level of cooperation remains low.
This comparison clearly shows the crucial role of I-TFT.
Let us recall Pavlov in comparison with EC: While
GT and TFT ignored the presence of an error within
the same species, not to be sucked by anyone, Pavlov
invented a recovery path (C,D)→ (D,D)→ (C,C) and
could be the final winner inM1. Nevertheless, it is at the
very point that GT overruns Pavlov. It is therefore not
surprising that Pavlov fails to enter Ω, because so many
strategies of M2 are willing to exploit its shortsighted
tolerance. Even though EC devises a more sophisticated
recovery path than Pavlov’s, it is still far from safe. The
point is that all of their states are recurrent: Even if they
use every given memory capacity to determine the next
move, once the patterns are recognized, the opponent can
get back to the defecting state as many times as it wants.
However, EC strategies are successful in the long run,
because they try to cooperate better at some expense of
security risk. The success of EC crucially depends on the
existence of such balancing strategies as I-TFT, and is
thus path-dependent.
IV. SUMMARY
In summary, we presented a thorough examination on
strategies under restrictions of the time horizon in the
iterated PD game. As the time horizon is enlarged, a
variety of trajectories to equilibrium become possible,
but there are still common dynamical patterns. That is,
the system reaches efficient cooperation through interme-
diate prevalence of TFT-like strategies, which solve the
dilemma between security and tolerance by using tran-
sient states. As I-TFT spends most time as the classical
TFT which refers only to the opponent’s last move, it
becomes even more likely to win if memory is costly [21].
This gives a clue for understanding how the memory
could be effectively saved in social interactions and dif-
ferentiated into other functions.
The detailed features of our observation in this paper
may be partially owing to our specific choice of elemen-
tary payoff values. However, we believe that the suc-
cessful strategies such as I-TFT and dynamical patterns
between them have good reasons to be remarkable in a
more general context of the evolutionary PD game.
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